

BW NITE MONO - 37

The CHAIRMAN. There have been a number of ads recently which state flatly and clearly that the Russians have an ABM system, so why shouldn't we. I would like to ask one or two questions, and then I will defer to the others.

DEPLOYMENT OF GALOSH SYSTEM

Is it not true that the original deployment of the Galosh system was to consist of [deleted] launchers and that this deployment has been cut back to some 60 launching sites? Is that not the intelligence community's estimate?

Secretary LAIRD. That is the figure that I have always used. I think that is agreed upon.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Is it not true that the intelligence community believes that the Soviet cut back their deployment of Galosh because they recognized it could not cope adequately with our offensive capability?

Mr. HELMS. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. That was one you gave to the committee.

Mr. HELMS. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have another one? Do you want to add anything?

Mr. HELMS. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That is consistent with what you say.

Secretary LAIRD. I want it pointed out there is no dispute as far as the intelligence is concerned that they are going forward and improving that system and [deleted] redirecting the [deleted] radars.

The CHAIRMAN. What bothers me is when you read these full-page ads which state without qualification that the Russians have an ABM, an effective ABM, and we ought to have one. I do not know whether this is part of the Starbird memorandum program or not. Have you seen these ads like this?

Secretary LAIRD. I do not know whether I have seen this.

The CHAIRMAN. "The Real Truth About How Many U.S. Senators Are Being Tricked by Russia," it says. It reads at the beginning:

"The Soviets will try for a knockout nuclear first strike * * * Marshal Malinovsky." It is a quote that "The Soviets are going for a first strike capability, and there is no question about it * * * Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird."

Secretary LAIRD. The first one was a quote from the Russian.

The CHAIRMAN. It says they have an ABM and we do not. Their ABM, if I understand it, and this was testified to before, is of very dubious effectiveness now, as you have just stated.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is misleading.

Secretary LAIRD. I think it is most important for you to understand that we do not discount the 64 ABM's which they presently have in place. We must assume that they work, and we must target them.

This idea that we do not have to target those ABM's is just ridiculous because we do [deleted]. They are orienting their radars toward the Chinese. They are [deleted] and I would assume they would deploy, when they go back into deployment, the new system rather than the old.

PROGRESS OF SOVIET ABM DEPLOYMENT

The CHAIRMAN. If it makes any progress. But the testimony—

Secretary LAIRD. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Defense Intelligence Agency have any recent information on the effectiveness of the new tests?

Mr. HELMS. [Deleted.]

ILLEGIB

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You have the National Security Agency. That is an additional one. Each of these forms a part of the intelligence community, do they not? They are members.

Mr. HELMS. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. On the intelligence community.

There is no necessity for your reconciling the intelligence estimates of the DOD with the National Security Agency, is there? You make your own findings in DOD.

Secretary LAIRD. The National Security Agency is part of DOD.

The CHAIRMAN. The Intelligence Board, which is chaired by Mr. Helms, gathers intelligence from a greater, a broader, scope than the DOD.

The DOD, you people, have the authority to make their own estimates based upon your own intelligence; that is correct, is it not?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I would rather have Dick Helms speak to this, [deleted].

[Deleted.]

ARRIVING AT DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE CONCLUSION

The CHAIRMAN. The direction of the question is this; It seems to me that it is quite possible, not necessarily, certainly not illegal or beyond its jurisdiction, for the Department of Defense to arrive at a different conclusion on such a question as has been under consideration here.

Secretary LAIRD. We have not done that, Mr. Chairman. I want to make that very clear. We have not arrived at a different position from the intelligence estimates in this whole matter.

As a matter of fact, I have leaned over backward not to paint the black picture that I could paint as Secretary of Defense. I want that to be understood, too.

[Deleted.]

Now, I have not overstated the case at any time. I have always used the intelligence estimate, the agreed upon estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to level an accusation.

[Secretary LAIRD. The SS-9's have gone over the highest level projected in the intelligence estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to level at this stage any kind of accusation. I am really trying to get my lines straight, if I can, as to how this whole intelligence operation works.

Secretary LAIRD. I want to make one thing very clear though, we do not use a separate set of estimates in the Department of Defense.

The Chairman. You said a moment ago, that you do not try to read the Russian mind. Didn't you make such a statement a minute ago?

Secretary LAIRD. As far as this question as to what they saw in the MOL. I am not sure what they saw.

The CHAIRMAN. You said, "I don't try to read the Russian mind." Well, I am very hopeful, and I believe it is the responsibility of the CIA, to read their mind insofar as they can. From all the information at hand, they try to arrive at some estimate of it. Maybe you have a different function. I am not trying to criticize you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary LAIRD. We do that, too.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to make out, if I can, how it works. These are complicated matters.

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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Monday - 15 September 1969

25X1A

1. [redacted] [redacted] on the Medical Staff, called and reviewed with me his feelings about the case of [redacted]. On the basis of this conversation I went back to Representative James Hanley (D., N. Y.) and suggested that he try to convince [redacted] to file for disability retirement when he sees her in Syracuse this coming weekend.

2. [redacted] Don Henderson, on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called and asked if we could give him a reference in the Congressional Record to complimentary remarks made by Senator Fulbright about Mr. Helms during the course of the ABM debate. I referred Mr. Henderson to statements made by Senators Fulbright and Symington on the floor of the Senate on 10 July 1969. (Page S7880.)

[redacted]

4. [redacted] Judith Purcell, in the office of Representative Clarence Brown (R., Ohio), called to request an employment interview for [redacted]. After checking with [redacted] Personnel, advised Miss Purcell that [redacted] appointment was with [redacted] at 3:00 p.m. today.

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